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Reference Group Behaviour and Economic Incentives: 
A Remark* 
It has repeatedly been claimed that social norms might be much more 
important in the determination of individual behaviour than economic incenti- 
ves. The aim of this note is to render some tangibility to the proposition that 
this kind of iizdividt~al behaviour might lead to a very strong sensitivity of 
aggregate response to economic incentives if the social standards of behaviour 
are formed according to reference group theory1. The argument will be 
developed along the lines of an example taken from labour economics, but 
other applications, e.g. to the theory of consumer behaviour, are straight- 
forward. 
Assume that productivity n of a given worlcer ist determined by average 
productivity n* prevailing in his reference group (among his fellow workers), 
and by the strength of an economic incentive e, which might represent apiece- 
rate in the simplest case, or, more generally, measure the incremental benefits 
accruing to the worker in terms of income and promotion if he increases his 
productivity. Thus, individual productivity n is assumed to be a function of 
reference productivity n* and of the economic incentive e: 
If reference productivity n* increases, the worker will increase his productivi- 
ty n even if the economic incentive e remains constant. This is so because the 
individual perceives himself as being put into a social r61e and will try to fulfil 
the associated requirements (which are perceived as n*) in order to maintain his 
self-esteem and to avoid being an outsider2. 
We assume, however, that an increase in reference productivity n* increases 
individual productivity not by just the same amount, but to a slightly lesser 
extend due to the fact that the individual comes closer now to his capability 
* Thanks to J. Frohn for a conversation which led me to put down the argument. 
It is the great merit of DUESENBERRY [I9491 of having introduced these considerations 
into economics. 
See IRLE [1975], pp. 165-175 and SINGER and HYMANS [I9681 for some psychological 
and sociological background and a less crude line of argument. 
limit. In other words, the partial derivative f,, is a.ssumed to be between zero 
and unity: 
Furthermore, a positive influence of the economic incentive on iildivjdual 
productivity is stjpulated: 
Given a set of identical individuals forming a reference group, given a fixed 
economic incentive, and starting from a historically given reference productivi- 
ty z*', each individual will fix his individual productivity according to (1). If TC 
happens to be above z", observed productivity will be above TC* in the next 
period. This will increase reference productivity for the whole group. Converse- 
ly, if TC is below n*, this will lead to a decrea.se in reference productivity. 
More formally, the following differential equation can be put down to 
describe the process: 
(The dot represents the time derivative, and p denotes a speed of adjustment.) 
Because of (4, the derivative a7i.*/an:': is negative, and the process (4) 
approaches an equilibrium productivity it which (if it exists) is uniquely 
characterised by the condition 
This condition defines equilibrium productivity implicitly as a function of the 
economic incentive e. If one looks at the impact of the economic incentive, one 
has to compute dE/de, which is 
It turns out, therefore, that the impact of the economic incentive becomes 
particularly strong iff,,, is close to unity: If reference group belzaoiour is very 
important individually, the economic inceratioe becomes verv power$rl evefl $it is 
rather nnifnportaizt individ~lally, i.e. iff, is very small. 
A further observation can be added: If reference group behaviour is iinpor- 
tant, implying f,, to be close to unity, the speed of convergence of process (4) 
will be rather small, too: A s lo~i  reactioiz to econornic iizcefrtives might inzplj! thar 
these incetztives are ver,y iinportant, since it might indicate that the "social 
multiplier" l/(l -.f,,) is particularly large. 
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Reference Group Behaviour and Economic Incentives: 
A Further Remark* 
The argument given in SCHLICHT [I9811 can be generalized to the case of 
heterogeneous individuals. 
Assume n workers forming a reference group. Denote actual productivity of 
a given worker by ni and his reference productivity by n*. In presence of an 
economic incentive e, the i-th worker determines his productivity according to 
where f2 denotes the partial derivative of T(.) with respect to the first 
argument, etc. 
Reference productivity nT follows the observed average productivity of the 
other workers which is perceived as 
Hence the process (4) in SCHLICHT [I9811 is replaced by the system of 
differential equations1 
The equilibrium values of n* =(nT, ..., n:) for given e are defined by the 
conditions 
This gives rise to the following proposition: 
If there exists n set of equilibrium aspiration levels it* =(it:, ... it:) satisfying (4), it 
is unique and globally stable. 
* This note has been written in response to one of several points of criticism of 
SCHLICHT [I98 11 by R. Cremer. 
Due to a printing error, the dot over R* on the left-hand side of (4) in SCHLICHT 
[I9811 has been omitted. 
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Proof: 
1. (Uniqueness) It is easy to check that the Jacobian of system (3) has a 
dominant diagonal. This establishes uniqueness, see NIICAIDO [1968], theorems 
21.1 and 20.4. 
2. (Global stability) Define 
as functions of 'n*, and consider the Ljapunov function2 
(6) Tf = max ]Ail . 
i 
It is to be shown that this function is decreasing over time. For a given state n*, 
let V E  (I. ,  2, ...., i z )  denote the index which maximizes the expression in (6) during 
the next instant (v need not be unique). Hence we have V=IA,\ and the time 
derivative 
(7) 
Since 
P = A., . sign d, . 
and since I A , , ~  2 1 ~ ~ 1 .  f {  < 1 for all j, this implies A,, < 0 for A, > 0 and A,, > 0 
for A,<O. 
Hence t is negative whenever it is defined. 
Since V is a continuous function which is piecewise continuously differentia- 
ble, the above argument is sufficient to establish the proposition that V is 
strictly decreasing over time. This proves stability. 
The impact of a change of the economic incentive e on equilibrium 
productivity call be calculated by noting that (4) implies 
i. e. that the average aspiration level and the average productivity are equal in 
equilibrium. Hence average productivity il can be identified with the average 
aspiration level 
Formula (4) can be re-written now as 
- 
On the Ljapunov technique, see BHATIA and SZEGO [1970], theorem 2.2, p. 66. 
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This can be differentiated and solved for dErlde. Summation with respect to i 
yields 
Solving for dElde gives the desired expression describing the impact of the 
economic incentive on productivity 
where 
It is easy to see that ai is close to lln if social interdependence is weak (f{ 
close to zero for all j) and that it tends to infinity if social interdependence is 
strong pi close to unity for all j). Furthermore, each ai is strictly increasing if 
f{ increases for one j. Hence, if one individual changes in such a way that his 
reference productivity becomes more important for him, this will increase the 
social productivity effect for all other individuals. 
Formula (13) is the analogue to (6) in SCI~LICI~T [1981]. The associated 
"social multiplier" can be defined as 
It gives the productivity increase induced by a "direct" productivity increase of 
unity. This term will be particularily large if reference group behaviour is 
important, i.e. if f2 is close to unity for many individuals. In this respect, the 
proposition of the earlier paper remains valid. 
The same can be said with regard to the relationship between the speed of the 
approach to equilibrium and the strength of the social multiplier: If all f{ were 
equal to unity, the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of system (3) would be all equal 
to zero. Hence the speed of adjustment in any direction would be zero. Since the 
eigenvalues are continuous functions of the matrix elements, it can be con- 
cluded that the speed of adjustment will be slow, and the social multiplier will 
be large, if reference group behaviour is important. 
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